
















































TOMB PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN CEMETERIES: COMPETITION 
IN THE MARKET FOR CORPSES? 
                   Francisco Marcos                Albert Sánchez                          Juan Santaló 
IE Working Paper        EC8-113-I                 22-01-2007 
 
Instituto de Empresa              Instituto de Empresa                Instituto de Empresa 
Business School                     Business School                        Business School 
         Serrano 118                          Serrano 118                          Mª de Molina 12, 4º 
28006 Madrid                         28006 Madrid                           28006 Madrid 
francisco.marcos@ie.edu         Albert.sanchez@ie.edu              juan.santalo@ie.edu 
Abstract 
 
We study empirically the determinants of public tomb prices in a sample 
of Spanish towns. We document strong evidence in favor that cemeteries 
act as local monopolies that use s econd degree price discrimination to 
maximize profits. Additionally we report that local cemetery prices react 
to competition from private cremation companies. This competition is 
associated  with  lower  price  dispersion  caused  by  an i ncrease  in  the 
minimum niche prices with no effect on other higher niche prices. We 
conclude  that cemete ries  have acco mmodated  and  facilitated  entry  of 
private cremation companies through an increase in those niche prices 
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Me gustan los cementerios de muertos bien repletos 
Que oliendo a sangre y cieno 
Impidan el respirar  
Y allí un sepulturero 
 con tétrica mirada y manos despiadadas 
 los cráneos machacar 
ESPRONCEDA 
Introduction 
  Most economics models predict that prices will not escalate in response to an increase 
in the number of competitors. Consistently, most of the empirical evidence suggests that 
prices indeed go down when more rivals enter any given market
1. Yet, considerably less 
research has been devoted to investigate if this stylized fact also holds when prices are not 
decided by profit maximizing companies but rather they are set directly by public authorities. 
The study of public pricing behavior is important to study the real effect of competition for 
those markets in which private operators coexist with public enterprises as it happens in 
markets like education, sport installations, parking, postal services, airports, vehicle 
inspection, security or health markets. Our goal is to contribute to fill this gap in the literature 
by studying the pricing behavior of council towns in a sample of Spanish cities that compete 
with private cremation companies. By this, we hope to contribute to the ongoing debate 
whether antitrust rules should be equally applied to profit and non-for-profit enterprises.   
With the same motivation, we investigate whether public operators follow similar pricing 
discrimination policies that we could expect from private local monopolies. 
 
 A priori we could think that standard economic model assumptions do not hold for public 
entities since prices are not chosen to maximize profits but rather to achieve other goals than 
maximizing social welfare
2. Legal mandates may indeed require public enterprises to 
consider values different from efficiency when fixing the prices for the services provided
3. In 
this regard, there are not clear a priori reasons why prices set by the civil servants working for 
the government should vary in response to an increase in market competition caused by the 
entry of other public or private operators providing a substitute product or service. On the 
contrary, in case public prices are designed to maximize social welfare, basic economic 
theory they suggest that prices should be set equal to the marginal cost of providing the 
product or service. Since marginal costs do not depend on the number of competitors we 
should observe a zero effect on public prices as a reaction to an increase in the number of 
competitors. Yet, civil servants may have other goals than solely maximizing consumer’s 
surplus in that particular market when deciding public prices. For example, they may intend 
to use the extra government revenues obtained by charging higher prices to cross- subsidize 
other unrelated activities that the public authorities think that deserve higher priority. If this is 
                                                 
1 See the classical reference of Bresnahan & Reiss (1987) and Bresnahan & Reiss (1991). 
2 See, for example, Pelzman (1971) and Sappintong & Sydack (2003). 
3 There may be a legal intricacy here as Spanish Law introduces some rules and limits in public pricing policies. 
When a service is only provided by the State or public authorities its price is named a “public tax”. These public 
services may be below cost (although ideally taxes charged for them should be aimed to cover the cost of 
service). If services are provided by the State in competition with private firms, its price is named “public 




the case, state owned enterprises may act as if they were maximizing a utility function in 
which operating profits is one of the arguments as it has been modeled by Sappington and 
Sidak (2003) and Philipson and Posner (2001). Under these circumstances public prices may 
indeed go down as a reaction to an increase in competition to avoid an erosion of profits in 
exactly the same way as a private operator would respond to the entry of a new competitor. 
Alternatively, private operators have strong incentives to lobby the local public institutions in 
favor of higher public prices to expand their private business market share in detriment of 
public revenues as well as the individual consumer. One goal in this paper is precisely to test 
which one of these explanations: “capture of the regulator to increase prices” versus “state 
companies behaving competitively as private companies” fits best the data in a sample of 
local cemeteries. 
 
 The other main objective of this paper is to investigate whether local public monopolies 
pricing policy is consistent with a standard model of private monopoly nonlinear pricing. A 
priori, a pricing behavior that maximizes social welfare should set all niche prices equal to 
the marginal cost of an additional niche. Since labor costs of a burial service does not change 
with the number of years of the niche concession or with the accessibility of the niche and 
since the surface of niches are quite similar for all type of niches we should expect that niche 
prices per year not to vary with the niche accessibility or the duration of the concession. On 
the contrary, a monopoly that maximizes profits will use the number of years of the niche 
concession and differences in the niche accessibility as mechanism to discriminate among 
consumers according to their different willingness to pay for the product and therefore charge 
different niche prices according to these characteristics. Below we report empirical evidence 
that the local cemeteries indeed act as local monopolies in their pricing policies.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows, section 2 briefly summarizes the related 
literature on the topics covered in the paper, section 3 describes basic regulatory conditions of 
the cemetery and crematory services market in Spain while section 4 discusses the standard 
implications of second degree price discrimination and the nature of competition for Spanish 
public cemeteries. Section 5 describes the sample and variable construction, section 6 
displays and discusses our empirical observations while section 7 concludes.          
 
To model ranking data, Thurstone (1931) proposed transforming the observed ranking 
patterns to patterns of binary paired comparisons and fitting his paired comparisons model 
(Thurstone, 1927) to the transformed data. The classical method for estimating this model 
(Mosteller, 1951a; Torgerson, 1958) consists in obtaining the normal deviate corresponding 
to each paired comparisons mean, and then estimate the model parameters from these 
deviates by least squares. This is a mean structure approach to estimating Thurstone's Case V 
model as it only uses univariate information (the means) from the paired comparisons. Most 
Thurstonian models for paired comparisons and ranking data are not identified when 
estimated as a mean structure. Estimating them as a mean structure requires introducing 
unnecessary identification restrictions on the models. The most notable exception is 
Thurstone's Case V model for ranking data. This model is identified if estimated only from 
the means of the paired comparisons. Here, we provide asymptotically correct standard errors 
and goodness of fit test for this model when it is estimated as a mean structure using the 




2. Related Literature Review  
 
Up to our knowledge this is the first study that analyzes the pricing behavior of public 
enterprises in cemetery services. There are some contributions that examine pricing behavior 
of public enterprises in the U.S.
4, like Peltzman (1971) classical study about electric utilities 
and a relatively large number of papers that study the effect of market concentration on prices 
in the hospital industry with mixed results (Lynk, 1995; Japsen, 1998, Simpson and Shin, 
1998; Dranove and Lindwick, 1999, Keele et alia, 1999; Kessler and MacClellan, 1999, Lynk 
and Neumann, 1999). Yet, we not know of any study that performs an empirical analysis of 
state-owned-cemetery pricing behavior.    
 
 On the other hand, there are a number of papers that have investigated the price 
discrimination policies of private operators in competitive environments. According to the 
extant theory, the effect of competition on price discrimination dispersion caused by optimal 
price discrimination policies is not univocal (for a complete review of the theoretical 
literature on this topic see Stole, 2006). In Stole (1995) competition increases price dispersion 
since high valuation consumers are more brand loyal and therefore price reductions needed to 
make them switch brands are so large that they are unprofitable. As a result competition 
affects proportionally more the lower prices increasing price dispersion. On the contrary, 
Rochet and Stole (1999) high valuation consumer receive larger surplus from consuming any 
brand and therefore are more likely to switch to a less preferred product in response to a price 
reduction. As a result competition is stronger for high valuation consumers and price 
dispersion is reduced with competition.  From the empirical side, Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) 
analyze the price curvature in electric utilities, Borenstein and Rose (1994) documents less 
price dispersion in the airline industry in less concentrated markets while Busse and Rynsman 
(2005) show how the price of yellow pages advertising goes down more for larger 
advertisements under increasing competition and therefore reducing price dispersion.  
 
 
3. Regulation of body disposal in Spain: Cemeteries and Crematories 
 
As in any other country, the law in Spain requires properly disposal of human dead bodies. 
The three legal alternatives are ground burial in cemeteries; sea burial and cremation. The 
most preferred option is ground burial in cemeteries chosen by more than 70% of the 
population.  
 
For sanitary and hygienic reasons, the Law in Spain requires every local town to have a 
cemetery
5. Cemeteries have to follow in their construction and management strict legal and 
regulatory constraints. These conditions and requirements are set by each autonomous 
community, and thus may vary
6. In general, the regulation establishes that the construction, 
                                                 
4 See Pelzman (1971) and Sappintong & Sydack (2003) 
 
5 See article 26.1.a) of the Law 7/1985, April 2 1985 (LBRL), only exceptionally it allows several towns to get 
together to build a joint cemetery.  
6 In those cases in which no regional regulation is adopted, the state regulation contained in decree 2263/1974 of 




enlargement or reform of cemeteries requires public approval. Of course, private initiative in 
cemetery services is allowed
7, however private cemeteries are required to respect and follow 
the same legal and regulatory requirements that public cemeteries
8. These requirements 
concern the exact location of the cemetery (which is also affected by other local 
administrative regulations regarding planning and use of urban spaces), the distance it has to 
maintain from other buildings and constructions, soil conditions (subject to an hydro geologic 
study), wind direction, cemetery capacity (generally  for burials the next 10 years but with 
enough land to build tombs and niches for the next 25 years),  size and material of the tombs 
and niches, and other services required for hygienic or sanitary reasons or for the benefit of 
visitors. 
 
Although State regulation does not require local towns to have a crematory, most of the 
regions have imposed this requirement themselves to the biggest cities. Thus, the requirement 
to have a public crematory varies with the population of the town.  Private crematories have 
also been established, mainly by funeral firms, normally in the installations where the 
viewing facilities (tanatorios) and other funeral services are rendered.  
 
In this regard, the market of body disposal has been historically linked with the market for 
funeral services, which covers all the services and rituals rendered from death to the act of 
final disposal.  Indeed, cemetery and crematory operators have frequently been funeral 
companies themselves. Aggarwal (2006), Aggarwall and Ellig (2006), Sutter (2006), 
Harrington (2002 and 2003) and Harrington and Krynsky (2002) have shown how U.S. State 
funeral regulations have helped funeral directors to steer demand away from cremation and 
have also prevented the use of internet as a competitive tool in the funeral markets. 
Curiously, that may be though as a backlash against the Federal Funeral Rule (16 CFR Part 
453), aimed at protecting funeral consumers, but which has allegedly benefited independent 
casket retailers and crematories at the expense of funeral homes, see McChesney (1990). In 
Spain, the funeral industry has been characterized historically until recently by important 
public intervention. Currently, although private firms are allowed to operate, heavy territorial 




4. Analytical framework 
 
Modeling the pricing behavior of cemeteries as local monopolies 
The total amount of money required to hire a cemetery niche varies both with the duration of 
the concession-from a minimum of one year to a maximum of 99- and the location of the 
niche that varies depending on the convenience of access for visitors. For example, niches 
located nearer to the cemetery entrance are more expensive while niches located at a larger 
height from the ground are cheaper. 
                                                 
7 The issue was subject to debate some years ago, but several judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court dealt 
with it  (Supreme Court judgments of 10 and 15 june 1994 and 14 february and 7 november 1995, all regarding 
the project for a private cemetery in Alcobendas). 
8 See, for example, article 54 of Catalonian Decree 297/1997, of november 25, 1997, establishes that all 
cemeteries, no matter if public or private are subject to the same legal and regulatory requirements. 





This pricing behavior looks quite similar to the pricing behavior of a monopoly that uses 
second degree price discrimination to maximize profits; precisely, our goal in this paper is to 
test whether council towns indeed act as local monopolies when deciding their pricing policy. 
With this in mind, we first display the empirical implications of a standard model of price 
discrimination [like Tirole (1988) chapter 3] for the purpose of testing later whether these 
implications hold in our sample of local cemeteries. For simplification, we consider just one 
dimension in the differentiation of the product and we assume that the consumer values 
exclusively the number of years of the concession of the cemetery space and not the 
accessibility of the niche in the cemetery.  
 
Assume that the utility of a given consumer θ for hiring a cemetery niche for a given number 
of years is: 
 
)) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( θ θ θ θ Y T Y V A U − + =  
 
Where Y is the number of years of the concession, T(Y(θ)) is the total price paid for Y(θ) 
years and we assume that V(0)=0, V’>0, V’’<0.  
 
Note that without loss of generality we can assume that the consumer is hiring a niche for 
himself in the future or equivalently that he is hiring the cemetery space for a family member. 
The consumers value positively the total number of years that they are hiring the cemetery 
niche since we believe that consumers value positively the longer availability of a given 
space in which the family can worship the memory of deceased family members or closed 
friends. The utility function of this yearly space availability follows the usual properties of 
positive and decreasing marginal utility. 
 
The cemetery monopolist (the council town administration) does not know the θ of each 
individual consumer or family and therefore has to design a pricing scheme restricted to the 
fact that each consumer or family will voluntarily choose the combination of Y and T that 
maximizes her utility. The distribution of θ in the populations has a density function f(θ) and 
a distribution function F(θ) over the interval ( ) θ θ,.  




θ θ θ θ d f cY T ) ( )) ( ) ( (  
where c is the constant marginal cost of renting a unit of Y in the cemetery. The monopoly 
maximization problem is subject to the individual participation constraints: 
θ θ θ θ ∀ ≥ − + ; 0 )) ( ( )) ( ( Y T Y V A  
and to the incentive compatibility, IC, constraints 
 
{} θ φ φ θ θ φ ∀ − + = )) ( ( )) ( ( max arg Y T Y V A  where we implicitly assume that the IC 
constraint are continuous and differentiable. The implications of this model are well-known 
and we do not prove them since its derivation can be easily found in any standard textbook as 

























increases with θ, and as consequence α s with θ. This is, the marginal 
price of a given year decreases when Y increases. Note that for the maximum value of 
θ, θ θ = ,  1 ) ( = θ α  and  θ θ θ α < ∀ >1 ) ( . The intuition of this result is that the monopoly 
charges a lower marginal price to the consumers that value the good the most to generate 
more consumer surplus that can be extracted from charging a higher average price. For 
consumers that have a lower valuation of Y the monopoly charges a higher marginal price, 
maybe even larger than the corresponding monopoly marginal price to avoid high type 
consumers to pretend that they are of the low valuation type and allow a better differentiation 
among consumers. As a result, this standard specification implies a Maskin-Riley quantity 
discount since the marginal price of contracting an additional year in the cemetery decreases 
with the number of years already contracted. 
 
A Model of Competition for local cemeteries  
 
The natural competitors of public cemeteries are private cemeteries that operate in the same 
local market. However, a quick view to the stylized facts point out that private cemeteries are 
quantitatively irrelevant in the Spanish market since there are only a total of 32 private 
cemeteries in Spain, with many locations not having one, accounting for less than 1% of 
cemeteries available
10. Furthermore, there exists only a handful of private cemeteries and 
most/all of them devoted to minority religions other than the overwhelmingly dominant 
catholic-Christian majority. Although one may be tempted to think Christian cemeteries 
constitute a competing force in the market, we exclude them from our analysis and 
subsequent model. We do so because, catholic cemeteries in all the cities of our sample are 
congested, and therefore it is impossible to contract for a burial on their premises. 
Apparently, they remain a strong and powerful competitor in many smaller cities and in rural 
areas (on which they can have around 20% of the market
11), however, these are not included 
in our sample. 
 
This absence of competition from private cemeteries might be due to important regulatory 
barriers to operate a private cemetery that usually requires at least 150 meters of distance to 
inhabited places, has to fit in the urban planning regulations of the town and cannot be build 
on all types of land, depending on the stratification of the soil, the existence of underground 
water courses and other technical conditions. These regulations do not apply to extant public 
cemeteries that have been absorbed inside the cities as a result of the process or urban 
expansion. This clearly gives a first-mover advantage for public cemeteries, since private 
cemeteries cannot be built in a similar location. In fact, some of the largest private cemeteries 
are located outside large cities, in an effort to offer a different landscape and to attract 
different customers. 
                                                 
10 These data are extracted from Tribunal de Cuentas (2006), Annex 11. 





However, the de facto irrelevance of private cemeteries does not mean that public cemeteries 
are totally isolated from the discipline of product market competition. Recently a quite 
powerful substitute product has emerged in the Spanish market that has stolen a sizable 
market share from the public cemeteries given that cremation of the body instead of burial 
has become an increasingly chosen option among Spaniards. From a virtual zero in the early 
1970s, cremation rates have surged to 17% in 2003 (the source of this figure is Atroesa, the 
largest crematory company operatingin Spain). The likely explanations for this surge in 
cremation rates are the non opposition of the Catholic Church since 1964; and the less 
stringent regulation of private crematories in comparison with private cemeteries. Indeed, 
private cremation can be conducted in "industrial" facilities, which are not so tightly 
constrained by planning regulations. Since cremation generates pollution but completely 
deletes all other sanitary risks (deriving from the decomposition of bodies), private 
crematories are mainly subject to environmental regulations. Therefore, the main constraint 
to the setting up of private crematories is the need to invest in expensive equipment that 
needs to be "certified" by the industry department of the corresponding CCAA. As a result, 
even if it can be time-consuming and expensive, entry barriers are much lower for the setting 
up of a private crematory than for the building of a private cemetery, as their possible 
locations are much more abundant. Moreover, as pointed out before, there is a relationship 
between private crematories and funeral viewing facilities (tanatories) built by funeral 
services firms. Private cremation is normally offered by funeral firms that can reach more 
easily scale economies (in terms of shared premises) with cremation than with burial 
facilities. Therefore, this easier vertical integration also generates larger incentives to entry 
the cremation market, rather than the market for cemeteries. 
 
The implicit assumption in our empirical tests will consist in assuming that consumers react 
to price changes and therefore they may opt with a larger probability to a private crematory 
depending on the price differences between the two alternatives. If this is the case, public 
local authorities may change the pricing policy as a reaction to competition from private 
crematories. If local cemeteries act as pure private enterprises that maximize profits, local 
cemeteries should react competitively with a decrease in niche prices to the introduction of a 
privately-owned crematory. (H2a).  
 
Yet, state-owned enterprises may care to a lesser degree or even ignore profit maximizing 
consideration when setting cemetery prices. In the market object of our study, local 
authorities may want to attract private crematory entry in their local town in order to satisfy 
regional regulations that force large cities to have a crematory facility available to its citizens, 
either public or privately owned.  Consistent with this train of thought, local cemeteries may 
increase niche prices to accommodate and facilitate the entry from private operators in the 













Local cemetery prices consist in the amount of money a given individual needs to pay to rent 
a given space in the public cemetery for a determined number of years. Therefore cemetery 
prices are renting prices since the cemetery space is public property that can be rented for 
some years but not sold or bought
12 . These prices vary with the number of years that the 
individual hires the niche and also they vary with other characteristics like the distance of the 
niche to the floor and to the main row. Different cemeteries classify the niches according to 
different location criteria. However, in general terms, they divide the niches in tiers. Lower 
tiers are cheaper and the prices increases for the central tiers (as they are at eye-height; 
similar to the pricing criteria that hypermarkets use to determine the charges for the space on 
their shelves). Higher tiers are cheaper than central tiers but, generally, remain more 
expensive than lower ones. Where cemeteries have older and newer premises, prices are also 
different for these two groups of constructions within the same or at different local cemeteries 
(then  classified by tiers separately). However, in some cities older locations are cheaper, 
while in other cities it is the opposite. This probably depends on local preferences, i.e. in 
certain places the oldest premises can be better or more appreciation due to local traditions, 
while in other cities they are new premises that have occupied better locations within the 
cemetery). 
 
In Spain all type of local cemetery prices are set by the corresponding local council towns. 
We collect information on cemetery prices consulting publicly available local regulations. 
Given that we need to collect this information separately for each town we start by restricting 
our sample to those Spanish towns that are capitals of an administrative unit called province. 
By proceeding in this quite conservative way we make sure that we properly identify the 
relevant geographic market, crematories are located either on the capital or on a close town. 




As a result we include information on 52 different Spanish towns that correspond to each 
province that covers the whole Spanish territory
14. In five of these 52 cities the local 
regulations do not provide cemetery prices. In these cases there is a public company that 
manages the cemeteries and sets the cemetery prices. We asked these public companies for 
the corresponding cemetery prices by mail and we got an answer of three out of these five 
cities. As a result our sample gets restricted to fifty cities from the originally 52
15.  
                                                 
12 Historically it was possible in Spain to sell and buy a given space in the public cemeteries. However, this was 
forbidden in the beginning of the XXth century (WHICH LAW, REFERENCES????) 
13 See, with reference to prior opinions, the 2005 Report of the Competition Defence Service on the acquisition 
by INTUR of Funerarias del AltoAragón (N-05031), available at http://www.dgdc.meh.es 
/informes%20SGC/N05031INFWEB.pdf, visited on aug. 15, 2006). 
14 We plan to expand our simple with information about other council towns in later stages of our research . 




The cemetery niche prices present some degree of complexity. First, the total tariff charged 
depend on the number of years that the consumer hires the niche and second they vary with 




We check directly with each council town for the existence of private or public local 
crematory companies as well as if any private company was involved at all in the 
management of local cemeteries and crematories. In all cities in our sample there existed a 
crematory although there is variation in the nature of its property: In 36 cases it belongs to 
privately owned company while in 14 it belongs to the local council town or to an 
administrative unit that depends on the council town.  
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
Effect of Competition on Niche Price Dispersion 
 
One of the main goals of the paper is to document and quantify the second degree price 
discrimination policy implemented by the Spanish local cemeteries. For this, from local 
cemetery regulations sources, we have collected the whole menu of niche prices in each 
cemetery belonging to a capital of the administrative unit called province. As we have 
explained above, niche prices vary both with the number of years of the cemetery licenses 
and the niche accessibility. Given the impossibility of comparing niche accessibility in 
different cemeteries, we focus on the minimum and the maximum niche price for each given 
number of years in the license.  In Graph 1 we display the distribution of our 50 cemeteries 
according to the number of different niche prices offered in our sample In some local 
cemeteries there is no variation at all in niche prices since there exists a unique niche license 
for a fixed number of years and the niche licenses are not differentiated by any type of more 
or less difficulty in accessing the niche. This happens in 13 of the 50 cemeteries in our 
sample.. The maximum number of prices available in our sample is six different prices 
corresponding to three different lengths of the niche license and a minimum and a maximum 
price for each type of license. This happens in only 3 cemeteries while the most common 
cemetery menu offers just two different cemetery prices: a minimum and a maximum price 
for a single license duration. This pricing policy is followed in 19 cemeteries in our sample. 
The average price over the 123 different niche prices in our sample is €1,394
16 with a large 
degree of variation since the minimum niche price is €24.94 for a niche concession of 10 
years in the city of Castellón while the maximum niche price is €72,159 in the city of San 
Sebastián for a niche concession of 75 years. 
 
Next we estimate the slope of the cemetery price schedule We follow Busse and Rysman 
(2005) and we use the function 
i i
k j i ijk Q Y A P
α β =   where Pijk is the total price of a niche 
license in province i of duration j and of quality k, Y is the number of years of the license and 
Qk is the accessibility of the niche. Note that this function allows a variety of price-year and 
                                                 




price-accessibility curvatures including linear pricing (βi =1;αi =1) , quantity discounting (βi 
<1;αi <1)and premia (βi >1;αi >1). Consistent with this specification we estimate: 
(1)  k i j i i ijk Q Y P α β δ + + = log log  
 
Where Q is not in logs because in our specification is just a dummy that indicates highest or 
lowest accessibility as it has been explained above and δi is estimated with a province fixed 
effect. The first column of Table 1 shows the results of estimating (X) in our sample 
composed by 123 niche prices corresponding to the year 2006. Note that the point estimate of 
β is 0.47 statistically different from zero and statistically different from 1 and therefore 
providing strong empirical evidence of the existence of a quantity discount and second degree 
price discrimination implemented by the local cemeteries. Our estimates of β point out that an 
increase in 100% in the duration of the license implies an increase in the niche price of 47% 
and therefore the niche price per year falls around 53%. Note that our estimates of α indicate 
that for a given duration of a license, niches of high accessibility are around 79% more 
expensive than niches of low accessibility. We interpret this as evidence if favor of H1. 
 
After having established the existence of price dispersion and quantity discounts, we next 
investigate whether price dispersion is affected by competition from private crematories. 
Again we follow Busse and Rysman (2005) and we hypothesize that: 
 
(2)  i i i v n Competitio + + = 1 0 γ γ β  and 
(3)  i i i n n Competitio + + = 1 0 λ λ α  
Combining 1, 2 and 3 we get that  
 
(4) 
k i j i k i
k j i j i ijk
Q n Y v Q n Competitio
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The second column of Table 1 shows the result of estimating (4) by OLS, note that the 
presence in the error term of  k i j i Q n Y v + log  in (ii) implies heteroskedasticity but the pairwise 
bootstrapping method that we use to construct the confidence intervals is robust to the 
existence of heteroskedasticity. Table 1 shows that the amount of year discount is not 
affected by the presence of competition since the interaction term between the duration of the 
license and competition is not statistically significant. Yet, Table 1 provides evidence that the 
difference between high accessibility and low accessibility prices decreases when the local 
cemetery competes with private crematory companies. The estimates of Table 1 suggest that 
the difference between high accessibility and low accessibility niche prices is 113% in the 
absence of a private crematory and only 63% when there is competition from a private 
crematory. We interpret Table 1 as evidence that competition decreases price dispersion in 
Spanish cemeteries. This empirical finding is consistent with two different explanations. High 
accessibility niche prices may go down with competition or it could be the case that low 
accessibility niche prices may go up with competition. The first explanation is consistent with 
a competitive reaction of cemeteries to competition from crematory companies, while the 
second explanation would imply accommodation to the competitor’s presence. In Graphs 2.a 




for both high accessibility and low accessibility niches. In Graph 2.a. the high accessibility 
curve goes down under competition from private crematories while in Graph 2.b. the low 
accessibility curve goes up in response to competition. Note however that the niche average 
price level would go down in the situation depicted in Graph 3.a and it would go up in Graph 
3.b. Graph 2.a. is consistent with H2a while Graph 2.b. is consistent with H2b.  
 
 Next we explore the effect on niche price levels of competition from private crematories for 
disentangling which situation fits best our data of cemetery prices.   
       
Effect of Competition on Price Levels 
 
When studying the effect of competition on price levels our sample gets reduced to just 50 
local markets corresponding to 50 Spanish provinces. Since we have just a cross section of 
data we can not estimate the effect of competition with a local fixed effect and therefore we 
need to control for other differences in local markets that may influence niche prices. Next 




Soil price exhibits an important degree of geographic variation in Spain. As in other countries 
is more expensive in cities and near to the shore. A more expensive soil price might be 
related to more difficulties and larger investments needed to expand the cemetery and hence 
it may cause higher niche prices in congested cemeteries. We have been unable to find soil 
prices statistics but we proxy local soil prices by province housing prices easily available at 
the web of a government institution, Ministerio de la Vivienda
17,  where we downloaded 
information regarding city price per square meter (m)
2 of new houses less than two year old. 
This information was not available for the autonomous African cities of Ceuta and Melilla 
and therefore we lose two additional observations to get a total sample of just 48 provinces 
whenever we introduce this control in our regressions.  
 
We are also interested in controlling for regional differences in labor costs. Again we use 
Spanish government sources and from the Encuesta Trimestral de Coste Laboral 
corresponding to the first quarter of 2006, where we access information of regional labor cost 
per person. This statistic is developed by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE
18, 
and although it provides information at the regional level it does not provide labor cost 
information disaggregated at the province level. This may cause measurement error in those 
regions that contain more than one province, yet we address this potential problem in our 
empirical specifications. Since the INE disaggregates Labor Cost depending on the sector of 
activity we have chosen Construction Labor Costs as representative of Labor costs of 
Cemeteries. Our rationality for choosing Construction costs rather than Services or Industry 
Labor Costs is that cemetery requires mostly an unskilled labor force and with similar low 
levels of specialization as those required in construction. 
                                                 
17 http://www.vivienda.es (visited on Aug. 15, 2006). 




Municipal cemetery prices are set directly by the local council town but the management of 
the cemetery might be delegated to a private company. There are four possible ways of 
organizing local cemetery services by local towns: the town officials may directly manage it 
as an additional municipal unit (a); the town may directly manage it as a wholly owned 
private company (b); the town may indirectly manage it through a company with a minority 
private partner (sociedad mixta) (c); or the local council may give an administrative 
concession to a private firm
19. This may cause an effect on cemetery prices either because 
private companies have lower operation costs or alternatively because private companies 
lobby successfully the local council in favor of larger prices.   
 
We control for any of these two possibilities with a dummy equal to one if a private company 
was involved at all in the management of public cemeteries. 
 
Some council towns own public crematories that may compete directly with private 
crematories. This may have an influence on niche prices either because the local council town 
engages in some sort of cross subsidization between public burial and public cremation or 
simply because niche prices react in a different way to competition depending whether public 
crematory prices already react to a direct competitor. We account for this possibility by 
controlling for local public crematory prices.  The sources of these prices are the same local 
regulations as the niche prices and in those cases in which a public crematory does not exist 
in the province we consider that public crematory prices are zero. 
 
Independent  variable  
 
 As before, we identify competition from private crematories with a dummy variable equal to 
one if there is a private crematory in the local market.   
 
Dependent variable  
 
Below we estimate the effect of competition from private crematories on cemetery price level 
using two alternative measures of prices as dependent variables: Total cemetery expenditure 
and Total cemetery expenditure divided by the number of years of the niche license. The 
second price measure has the advantage that we are properly comparing niche price per year 
in different localities and therefore we are comparing prices of homogeneous goods. On the 
contrary, the first measure has the advantage of comparing the real cost paid by the families 
to bury a deceased member since the cemetery menu prices are not indivisible in a year by 
year basis and the families are forced to pay upfront the total amount demanded by the local 
cemetery for the niche. As we show below, the results are the qualitatively the same with 
both price measures. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of all the variables that we use 
in the regression.  
 
                                                 
19 See Tribunal de Cuentas (2006) for an explanation of all the alternatives (the options could be further 
enlarged if we took into account whether the town council renders –necessarily through a private company, after 
1996 liberalization- also funeral services). Annex 3 of Tribunal de Cuentas (2006) provides evidence of the wide 




We have a small sample with only 50 observations and this sample size may question the 
statistical validity of our results. In particular the asymptotic properties of OLS estimators 
clearly not hold in such a small sample. However in all our regressions we report the 
statistical significance of the coefficients using both the standard errors coming from the OLS 
regression and using a bootstrap method of 2000 regressions on 2000 samples of the size as 
the original one obtained sampling with replacement the original sample. With a few 
irrelevant exceptions, the significance results are qualitatively the same using both methods  
Table 3.a. displays the results of different regressions in which the dependent variable is total 
cemetery expenditure while Table 3.b displays the results of regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the average cemetery expenditure per year. The first two columns of 
Table 1.a. show how competition from private crematories is associated with higher 
minimum prices. The presence of a private crematory increases the minimum cemetery 
expenditure by around 55%to 61%. The economic and statistical significance of this 
correlation does not vary with the inclusion of control variables. The third and fourth 
columns of Table 3.a. display the results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable 
is the average over the different menu prices that a given cemetery offers to its customers. 
The central columns of Table 3.a show how the effect of competition on average total 
expenditure is not significant and its point estimate much lower, about half, than the point 
estimate of the effect of competition on minimum cemetery expenditure in columns 1 and 2. 
Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we take as dependent variable the maximum price that the local 
cemetery offers in its menu of prices. We see that the point estimate of the effect of 
competition on maximum prices is much lower than both average and minimum cemetery 
prices. We conclude that the effect of competition on cemetery prices is to increase the 
minimum cemetery expenditure while the effect on the average or maximum cemetery 
expenditure is inconclusive. 
 
Table 3.b. replicates the exact same previous analysis but taking as dependent variable not 
total cemetery expenditure but total cemetery expenditure divided by the number of years of 
the concession of the niche. Note that the results are qualitatively the same, since competition 
from private crematories increases the minimum niche price per year while it does not affect 
significantly either average or maximum niche prices per year. Table 3.b suggests that the 
minimum niche price per year increases between 95% and 82% in those locations with 
private crematory. This estimate is around two thirds lower for both the average cemetery 
price per year and the maximum niche price per year. As above we conclude that the 
competition affects significantly the minimum niche price per year while its effect on the 
average and maximum niche price per year is inconclusive. 
 
Discussion of the results 
 
We have access to a single cross section of current cemetery prices since past niche prices are 
not posted and are extremely hard –if not impossible- to obtain. The fact that we do not have 
a panel data restricts significantly our ability to estimate the effect of competition in public 
cemetery prices. Pure cross section estimates may be subject to endogeneity bias since it is 
likely that private crematories will enter precisely in those places with higher cemetery 
prices. If this is the case, even if cemeteries have reacted to competition with a price 




local private crematory. Yet, there are regulatory reasons to believe that the introduction of 
private crematories is exogenous at least up to some extent. Some autonomous community 
governments have regulated that every single city with more than 20,000 inhabitants needs to 
have either a public or a private crematory
20. As a result, crematory company entry in these 
markets may be a result of exogenous regulation instead of a reaction to larger niche prices 
and our estimates would be free of endogeneity bias. Furthermore, this regional regulation 
may explain why public cemeteries have accommodated the entry of private crematories 
since private operators may have committed to enter the market under the negotiated 





In this paper we have analyzed empirically the determinants of tomb pricing in a sample of 
Spanish cemeteries. We have found that local cemeteries follow a pricing policy equivalent to 
a monopoly that uses second degree price discrimination to maximize profits. Additionally, 
we report that local cemetery prices are affected by competition from private crematories. 
Niche price dispersion is reduced when a private crematory competes with the cemetery. In 
particular it seems that local cemeteries have accommodated the entry of private crematories 
by increasing the minimum niche prices without affecting conclusively other higher tomb 
pricing in a behavior consistent with the situation depicted in Graph 3.b. Therefore it seems 
that these type of local state owned enterprises behave less competitively than standard for-
profit companies since they facilitate entry of private competitors by increasing prices and as 
a result reducing consumer welfare.  
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Table 1: Cemetery quantity discount and competition 
 Dependent  Variable 














Log (duration)  .47










Quality   .79
























2  .74 .76  .76 
Obs 123  123  123 
 
All regressions include 50 dummies corresponding to each Spanish province in our sample. 
(*) Significant at 10%; (**) Significant at 5%; (***) Significant at 1% Std deviation is below 
the coefficient among parenthesis, we also include the standard deviation computed by a 
bootstrap of 2000 iterations sampling with replacement the significancy according the 
bootstrap is reported in red: (
*) Significant at 10%; (
**) Significant at 5%; (
***) Significant at 





Table 2 Descriptive statistics at the province level 




1 €  2,447  10087  50 
Average Niche Price
1 €  1,234.79 4055.06  50 
Minimum Niche Price
1 €  381.91  330.18  50 
Maximum Niche Price per year of concession
1 
€ 
83.58 141.52  50 
Average Niche Price per year of concession
1 €  53.81  72.10  50 
Minimum Niche Price per year of concession
1 
€ 
32.20 50.68  50 
Housing prices
2 € 2083.52  573.01  48 
Private company involved in Management
3   0.24  0.43  50 
Competition from Private Crematory
4  0.72 0.45  50 
Public Crematory Prices
5 €  170.85  204.76  50 
Labor costs
6 € 16149  1988  48 
 
1Niche Prices include the niche license price, the inhumation tax and the license for 
inhumation if applicable.   
2New housing prices (less than two-year old) in euros per m
2 
3 Dummy variable equal to one if any private company is involved in the management of the 
local cemeteries 
4Dummy variable equal to one if there exists a private local crematory. 
5 Cremation prices of public crematory if there is one in the province. If there is none then 
this variable has value equal to zero. 





Table 3.a. Effect of competition on Niche Price levels 




































































































50 48  50  48  50  48 
  
(*) Significant at 10%; (**) Significant at 5%; (***) Significant at 1% Std deviation is below 
the coefficient among parenthesis, we also include the standard deviation computed by a 
bootstrap of 2000 iterations sampling with replacement the significancy according the 
bootstrap method is reported in red: (
*) Significant at 10%; (
**) Significant at 5%; (
***) 
Significant at 1% 
 
Notes: All variables are in logs; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%; in parenthesis the standard deviation; We also computed the standard deviation of the 
estimation via bootstrap with 2000 re-samples with replacement; the significance according 
the bootstrap method is reported in parenthesis: (*) Significant at 10%; (**) Significant at 










Table 3.b. Effect of competition on  Niche Price per year 

















































Labor costs    1.95











































































2  .13 .62  .02  .40  -0.00  .24 
Number of 
Observations 
50 48  50  48  50 48 
 
(*) Significant at 10%; (**) Significant at 5%; (***) Significant at 1% Std deviation is below 
the coefficient among parenthesis, we also include the standard deviation computed by a 
bootstrap of 2000 iterations sampling with replacement the significancy according the 
bootstrap is reported in red: (
*) Significant at 10%; (
**) Significant at 5%; (










Ymin1  Ymin2  Ymin3 
TMin3 
Tmin1 
























































High accessibility without competition
Low accessibility
High accessibility with competition
 
Graph 2.b. 
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